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Abstract  14 
Factors influencing allocation of resources to male and female offspring continue to 15 
be of great interest to evolutionary biologists. A simultaneous hermaphrodite is 16 
capable of functioning in both male and female mode at the same time, and such a 17 
life-history strategy is adopted by most flowering plants and by many sessile aquatic 18 
animals. In this paper, we focus on hermaphrodites that nourish post-zygotic stages, 19 
e.g. flowering plants and internally fertilizing invertebrates, and consider how their 20 
sex allocation should respond to an environmental stress that reduces prospects of 21 
survival but does not affect all individuals equally, rather acting only on a subset of 22 
the population. Whereas dissemination of pollen and sperm can begin at sexual 23 
maturation, release of seeds and larvae is delayed by embryonic development.  We 24 
find that the evolutionarily stable strategy for allocation between male and female 25 
functions will be critically dependent on the effect of stress on the trade-off between 26 
the costs of male and female reproduction, i.e. of sperm and embryos. Thus, we 27 
identify evaluation of this factor as an important challenge to empiricists interested in 28 
the effects of stress on sex allocation. When only a small fraction of the population is 29 
 2 
stressed, we predict that stressed individuals will allocate their resources entirely to 30 
male function and unstressed individuals will increase their allocation to female 31 
function. Conversely, when the fraction of stress-affected individuals is high, stressed 32 
individuals should respond to this stressor by increasing investment in sperm and 33 
unstressed individuals should invest solely in embryos. A further prediction of the 34 
model is that we would not expect to find populations in the natural world where both 35 
stressed and unstressed individuals are both hermaphrodite. 36 
 37 
keywords: sex allocation, hermaphroditic, dioecious, simultaneous hermaphrodite, 38 
stress, evolutionarily stable strategy 39 
 40 
1. Introduction  41 
The factors influencing allocation of resources to male and female offspring continue 42 
to be of great interest to evolutionary biologists [1]. Sex allocation will be influenced 43 
by the breeding system of a particular species. Breeding systems can be categorised as 44 
dioecious, in which individuals are either male or female for their entire lifetime or 45 
hermaphroditic, in which the same individual can produce both male and female 46 
gametes. Hermaphrodites can be either sequential or simultaneous. Sequential 47 
hermaphrodites, or sex changers, function as one sex early in their life, and then 48 
switch to the other. Simultaneous hermaphrodites are capable of both male and female 49 
reproduction at the same time, representing a prevalent life-history strategy among 50 
sessile organisms, notably flowering plants and modular colonial animals [2]. 51 
Allocation is often strongly influenced by environmental conditions [1,3] and here we 52 
consider how hermaphrodites cope with an environmental stress that acts only on a 53 
subset of the population simultaneously. 54 
 3 
It has been demonstrated in hermaphroditic plants and animals that environmental 55 
stress promotes increased allocation to male rather than female function [4,5]. During 56 
the time required to produce a seed or larva, a hermaphroditic plant or animal can 57 
potentially release many pollen grains or sperm and so fitness through male function 58 
can begin to accrue immediately after sexual maturation whereas fitness through 59 
female function is delayed. Hence a plausible explanation for stress-induced 60 
allocation to male function is that the stressed organism is less likely to die before 61 
reproducing successfully as a male than as a female. Here we present a mathematical 62 
model that allows the quantitative consequences of this differential survivorship to be 63 
evaluated. Specifically, we assume that under many ecological circumstances, some 64 
(but not all) of a population will be subject to stress. For a population of flowering 65 
plants or sessile aquatic invertebrates, such patchy stresses might include localised 66 
grazing, overgrowth by larger individuals, or localised damage by wind or water 67 
currents [5]. We further assume that individuals can control their allocation to both 68 
male and female function in response to environmental cues that signal whether or not 69 
that individual will be subject to the stressor. Under these assumptions, we produce 70 
predictions for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in terms of the division of 71 
resources to male and female reproduction not just for stressed individuals but also for 72 
unstressed individuals within the same population. Although generally ignored by 73 
previous treatments, there is no reason to expect that the changed allocation by 74 
stressed individuals will not induce a change in unstressed individuals within the same 75 
inter-breeding population. We will particularly focus on quantifying how the 76 
evolutionarily stable strategies of both stressed and unstressed individuals are affected 77 
by the fraction of the population that is stressed.  78 
 79 
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2. Model definition 80 
The strategy of an individual is defined by the pair {mn,ms}, this being the investment 81 
in male sexual function (hereafter “sperm”) by an individual experiencing either 82 
normal (n) or stressed (s) conditions (mn, ms [0,1]). An individual playing {mn,ms} 83 
will produce a fraction mn(ms) of the sperm in the unstressed (stressed) condition that 84 
it would produce if it chose to invest entirely in sperm: mn=1(ms=1). Thus we 85 
explicitly assume that individuals have a flexible strategy for investment between 86 
male and female functions, and change strategy according to whether they perceive 87 
themselves as stressed or not.  88 
 89 
In order to capture the assumption that male and female functions compete for 90 
resources, we assume that female sexual function (hereafter termed “embryos”) can 91 
be found for either of these two cases from relations fn(mn) and fs(ms). That is, once 92 
investment in sperm is specified, these functions can be used to calculate the 93 
consequence of this investment for investment in embryos. These two functions may 94 
be different from each other, but have the following properties: 95 
 96 
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where the relative cost of embryos to sperm in unstressed (stressed) individuals is bn  99 
(bs).  100 
 101 
These restrictions simply mean that if all resources are spent on sperm then there can 102 
be no investment in embryos, whereas if there is no investment in sperm, then all 103 
 5 
resources can be channelled into embryos. If total resource allocation to male function 104 
yields volume 1 of sperm for each type of individual, total allocation to female 105 
function gives sperm-volumes of 1/bn and 1/bs to unstressed and stressed individuals 106 
respectively. We note that allowing total allocation to yield different volumes of 107 
sperm in stressed and non-stressed individuals makes no difference to the results, as 108 
only the relative costs of embryos to sperm are important.   109 
We also assume that the derivatives of both functions are always negative. 110 
Biologically this assumption means that increasing investment in sperm can only be 111 
achieved at the cost of reduced production of embryos. An individual playing {mn,ms} 112 
will thus produce a fraction fn (mn)(fs (ms)) of the embryos in the unstressed (stressed) 113 
condition that it would produce if it chose to invest entirely in eggs: mn=0(ms=0). We 114 
use the general functions fn (mn) and fs (ms) to allow for different levels of cost to be 115 
available for intermediate levels of resource allocation. If volume of embryos is just 116 
proportional to resources allocated we get the simple linear resource functions   117 
used later in this section  118 
n
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so that if half of the resources are allocated to embryos and half to sperm, half the 120 
maximum volume of each are produced,  fn (0.5)=0.5/ bn, for unstressed individuals. It 121 
is possible to envisage situations where production is either more (or less) efficient 122 
when divided, so that if sufficient resource was allocated to produce half of the 123 
maximum sperm volume then more (or less) than half of the maximum volume of 124 
embryos would be produced i.e. fn (0.5)>0.5/ bn ( fn (0.5)<0.5/ bn), for unstressed 125 
individuals.   126 
 127 
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To find the ESSs, we consider a mutant individual that plays {mn,ms} in a population 128 
of other individuals that play the resident strategy {mn*,ms*}. We assume that each 129 
individual has (independent) probability s of being stressed. If an individual is 130 
stressed, then there is a probability that the individual will die before resources 131 
allocated to sperm can be released as functioning gametes. This is represented as a 132 
probability pm that resources allocated to male function lead to successful production 133 
of viable gametes. There is a similar probability for investment in female function pf. 134 
As discussed in the introduction, the overwhelming empirical evidence is for pm to be 135 
greater than pf.  136 
 137 
If we make the simple Fisherian assumption that both male and female gain functions 138 
are linear (effectively that all females will have the same number of offspring on 139 
average, and each male is equally likely to be the father of any given offspring), then 140 
we can apply the classical fitness function for the sex-ratio game [5,6]. For a mutant 141 
parent which has a fixed expected number of children irrespective of their sex and has 142 
male children with probability m in a population where males are in proportion m* 143 
this fitness function is given by 144 
 145 
*1
1
*
*;
m
m
m
m
mmR .  146 
 147 
Here the unique evolutionarily stable solution is for the population to invest in both 148 
sexes in equal proportion m*=0.5. We shall see that the situation is more complex in 149 
our case, as there are potentially different costs applied to two distinct types of 150 
individuals.  151 
 152 
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Using the above equation we can express the pay-off to the mutant as 153 
 154 
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**1
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1
**,;, . (1) 155 
 156 
We can simplify this expression by defining some composite constants. Specifically, 157 
we define  158 
 159 
s
spm
1
 160 
and 161 
s
sp f
1
. 162 
 163 
From our arguments above about the relative values of pm and pf, we would expect  164 
to be greater than  in the overwhelming majority of ecological circumstances. We 165 
will also simplify the notation for embryos, using simply fn and fs to denote fn(mn) and 166 
fs(ms); and fn* and fs* to denote fn(mn*) and fs(ms*). We will also use  to denote the 167 
derivative of these functions. So that fs*  is the derivative of fs evaluated at ms*.  168 
 169 
Using these notational simplifications, we can simplify our expression (1) for the pay-170 
off to a mutant to the expression below: 171 
 172 
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 174 
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A strategy {mn*,ms*} is an ESS if and only if within a population where almost all 175 
individuals play this strategy, and a small fraction ε play an alternative strategy 176 
{mn,ms}, the payoff to an individual playing {mn,ms} would be less than the payoff to 177 
an individual playing {mn*,ms*}, i.e.  178 
 179 
)*)1(,*)1(;,)*)1(,*)1(*;*, ssnnsnssnnsn mmmmmmRmmmmmmR  180 
 181 
It is clear that a necessary condition for this to hold for arbitrarily small ε is 182 
 183 
**,;,**,*;*, snsnsnsn mmmmRmmmmR                                                       (3) 184 
 185 
for all alternative {mn,ms}. We note because of the form of the payoff function in 186 
equation (2), condition (3) is a sufficient condition as well, since whenever an 187 
invading group uses a larger (smaller) male investment, this increases (decreases) the 188 
number of males in the population, which decreases (increases) the payoff to males 189 
compared to females.  190 
  191 
For general functions R it is not possible to give more specific conditions which are 192 
equivalent to condition (3), but we can give some necessary conditions. For normal 193 
individuals, if 0< mn*<1 we require (at ε=0) that 194 
0
nm
R
 195 
and either R is constant in a population of {mn*,ms*} individuals or 196 
0
2
2
nm
R
 197 
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at mn= mn*.  198 
If mn*=1 we require 199 
0
nm
R
 200 
at mn=1.  201 
If mn*=0 we require 202 
0
nm
R
 203 
at mn=0.  204 
These conditions ensure that a population cannot be invaded by individuals playing 205 
{mn,ms*} where mn is sufficiently close to mn*.  206 
Similar conditions are required for ms. 207 
These necessary conditions are also sufficient for {mn*,ms*} to be an ESS whenever 208 
at most one of 0< mn*<1, 0< ms*<1 holds, and there are no extra cases where R has 209 
zero derivative, other than when the population strategy is {mn*,ms*}. 210 
 211 
Thus to find ESSs we must consider the signs of the derivatives of the function R, and 212 
we obtain the following expressions:  213 
 214 
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and 216 
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 218 
To find ESSs, we must substitute mn = mn* and ms = ms* into (4) and (5).  219 
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 220 
The expressions in (4) & (5) can also be derived by differentiating the simpler 221 
function 222 
 223 
snsn ffmm .         (6) 224 
 225 
Thus we shall consider the derivatives of (6), which is equivalent to considering those 226 
of our original (but more complex) expression, since only the signs of those 227 
derivatives are important.  228 
 229 
To make further progress we must explicitly specify the trade-off between male and 230 
female functions for both stressed and unstressed members of the interbreeding 231 
population. As discussed above, we will assume the following simple linear resource 232 
allocation functions:  233 
 234 
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 238 
Thus, the values given to the two parameters bn and bs describe the relationship 239 
between female and male functionality for the two cases (stressed and unstressed). A 240 
value of one for either of these parameters suggests an equal cost of sperm and 241 
embryos. A value higher than one implies a larger cost (in terms of investment 242 
required to produce one gamete) to egg production than sperm production. The 243 
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overwhelming empirical evidence is that, per gamete, sperm are cheaper and quicker 244 
to produce than embryos. Thus we would expect bn and bs to both be greater than one.  245 
 246 
Let us further define the following composite parameters: 247 
 248 
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b
b
b ,  249 
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1
1  and 250 
b
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1
1 12 . 251 
Thus b describes the effect of stress on the trade-off between sperm and embryos. If b 252 
is equal to one then stress has no effect on this trade-off. If b is greater than 1, then 253 
sperm is more expensive (relative to embryos) for stressed individuals compared to 254 
unstressed individuals. Conversely, if b is less than one then sperm is less expensive 255 
for stressed individuals. As we shall see, the separate values of bn and bs  256 
do not affect our results, although their ratio b does. 257 
 258 
Let us return to considering expression (6), which (utilising our newly-introduced 259 
composite parameters) is given by the following expression: 260 
 261 
snnsns
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After re-arrangement and dropping simple constant multipliers, one can demonstrate 263 
that (7) varies as the simpler expression: 264 
 265 
 12 
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 267 
The derivatives of S are easily obtained:  268 
 269 
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 273 
3. Possible ESS forms 274 
We need to consider nine different possibilities for the form of an ESS: mn could be 275 
zero, or one, or a value between zero and one. That is, normal individuals could invest 276 
entirely in embryos, or entirely in sperm or in a combination of the two. The same is 277 
true for stressed individuals.  278 
 279 
Two of the nine combinations, S(0,0) and S(1,1), can be immediately discounted, 280 
since for them S= 0 which yields minimum reward. Thus neither {0,0} nor {1,1} can 281 
ever be an ESS. This clearly makes sense, as it would never be beneficial for the 282 
whole population of stressed and unstressed individuals to all invest only in embryos 283 
or all invest only in sperm.  284 
 285 
Let us now consider the case where both stressed and unstressed individuals adopt a 286 
hermaphrodite strategy of investing in both embryos and sperm: i.e. 0 < mn,ms < 1.  287 
 288 
For this to occur, the following is a necessary condition: 289 
 13 
 290 
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 292 
It is straightforward to show that this leads to the condition below: 293 
 294 
b . 295 
 296 
This expression leads to our first general conclusion, only in very unlikely 297 
circumstances, where parameter values are carefully tuned, could we get an ESS 298 
where both stressed and unstressed individuals are hermaphrodite. In almost all 299 
circumstances, we would expect one or both of them to specialise and invest all their 300 
resources in either embryos or sperm. We will now consider the remaining six cases 301 
where at least one party (the stressed or the unstressed individuals within the 302 
population) specialises in only one sexual role.  303 
 304 
Case 1) Unstressed individuals invest only in embryos, stressed individuals only 305 
in sperm: {mn,ms} = {0,1}.  306 
 307 
For this to be an ESS necessary and sufficient conditions are that at {0,1} the 308 
following to expressions are satisfied: 309 
 310 
0,0
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m
S
. 311 
 312 
From (9) and (10), this simplifies to the conditions  313 
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 314 
1,1 b . 315 
 316 
Case 2) Unstressed individuals invest only in embryos, but stressed individuals 317 
devide resources between both embryos and sperm: {mn,ms} = {0,0<ms<1} 318 
 319 
For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at {0,ms}: 320 
 321 
0,0
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S
. 322 
 323 
From (9) and (10), this simplifies to the conditions below: 324 
 325 
1, bb  326 
 327 
and give the equilibrium strategy for stressed individuals below: 328 
 329 
b
b
ms
2
1
. 330 
 331 
For this to be an ESS we also need to verify stability against changes in the value of 332 
ms. The derivative of S, and so R, is zero at ms = ms*. Since R is linear in ms, given the 333 
population mixture, this means that R is constant for all ms. As stated earlier in the 334 
text following condition (3), this is enough to prevent invasion by an individual 335 
playing an alternative value of ms, and we thus have stability.  336 
 337 
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Case 3) Unstressed individuals invest only in sperm; stressed individuals only in 338 
embryos: {mn,ms} = {1,0}. 339 
 340 
For this to be an ESS, necessary and sufficient conditions are that at {1,0} 341 
 342 
0,0
sn m
S
m
S
. 343 
 344 
This simplifies to the conditions below:  345 
 346 
1,1 b . 347 
 348 
Case 4) Unstressed individuals divide investment between both sperm and 349 
embryos, whereas stressed individuals invest only in embryos: {mn,ms} = 350 
{0<mn<1,0}. 351 
 352 
For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at {mn,0} 353 
 354 
0,0
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S
m
S
. 355 
 356 
This simplifies to the conditions below: 357 
 358 
1, bb , 359 
 360 
and give the equilibrium for division of resources for unstressed individuals as below: 361 
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mn . 363 
 364 
This is shown to be an ESS in the same way as in Case 2. 365 
 366 
Case 5) Unstressed individuals divide investment between both sperm and 367 
embryos; stressed individuals invest only in sperm: {mn,ms} = {0<mn<1,1}. 368 
 369 
For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at {mn,1} 370 
 371 
0,0
ns m
S
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. 372 
 373 
This simplifies to the conditions below 374 
 375 
b,1 , 376 
 377 
and gives the equilibrium value of investment for unstressed individuals: 378 
 379 
2
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 381 
This is shown to be an ESS in the same way as in Case 2. 382 
 383 
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Case 6) Unstressed individuals invest only in sperm; stressed individuals divide 384 
investment between both embryos and sperm: {mn,ms} = {1,0<ms<1}. 385 
 386 
For this to be an ESS, necessary conditions are that at {1,ms} 387 
 388 
0,0
sn m
S
m
S
. 389 
 390 
This simplifies to the conditions that 391 
 392 
1,b , 393 
 394 
and also give the equilibrium value defining investment by stressed individuals: 395 
 396 
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
c
c
c
ms . 397 
 398 
This is again shown to be an ESS in the same way as in Case 2.  399 
 400 
4. Discussion 401 
Combining all of these cases, it is easy to see that we always have a unique ESS. 402 
For any combination of parameter values, we can find the ESS strategies for both 403 
stressed and unstressed individuals. These are summarised in Figure 1.  404 
 405 
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When there are no stressed individuals, then s 0, and so 0 and 0, and thus 406 
the ESS strategy is for individuals to divide their investment equally between embryos 407 
and sperm (mn =0.5). This equal investment in embryos and sperm is a consequence 408 
of us making the simple Fisherian assumption that both male and female gain 409 
functions (change in fitness as a function of allocation) are linear. How allocation is 410 
predicted to change as a small number of individuals become stressed depends on 411 
parameter values. In particular it depends on whether b  > , which can be re-412 
expressed as the condition: 413 
f
m
s
n
p
p
b
b
.         (11) 414 
 415 
If condition (11) is satisfied, then stressed individuals should invest fully in embryos 416 
(ms = 0) and unstressed individuals should increase their investment in sperm above 417 
50% (mn > 0.5). As the fraction of the individuals that are stressed increases (but 418 
remains relatively modest), the investment of unstressed individuals in sperm should 419 
increase. If (11) is not satisfied, then stressed individuals should invest fully in sperm 420 
(ms = 1) and unstressed individuals should increase their investment in embryos above 421 
50% (mn < 0.5). As the fraction of the individuals that are stressed increases (but is 422 
still relatively modest), investment of unstressed individuals in embryos should 423 
increase.  424 
 425 
We must now interpret condition (11) biologically. It is more likely to be satisfied if pf 426 
> pm, and we argue in the introduction that we expect this to be very unlikely. It is 427 
also more likely to be satisfied if the trade-offs between embryos and sperm differ in 428 
stressed and unstressed individuals such that embryos are more expensive (relative to 429 
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sperm) for unstressed individuals. Thus, another general conclusion that we draw 430 
from investigation of our model is that the evolutionarily stable strategy for allocation 431 
between male and female functions will be critically dependent on the effect of stress 432 
on the trade-off between the costs of sperm and embryos (the parameter b in our 433 
model). If b is equal to one then stress has no effect on this trade-off. If b is greater 434 
than 1, then sperm are more expensive (relative to embryos) for stressed individuals 435 
compared to unstressed individuals. Conversely, if b is less than one then sperm is 436 
less expensive for stressed individuals. Thus, we identify evaluation of this factor as 437 
an important challenge to empiricists interested in the effect of stress on sex 438 
allocation. 439 
 440 
In the absence of any clear reason to think otherwise, if we assume that the relative 441 
physiological costs of embryos and sperm are unaffected by stress, then b will equal 442 
one and we would expect (11) not to be satisfied and so stressed individuals to 443 
allocate entirely to male function and unstressed individuals to increase their 444 
allocation to female function. However, this prediction holds only when the fraction 445 
of the population that is stressed is relatively small.  446 
 447 
Within this region where only a small fraction of the population is stressed at any one 448 
time (the bottom left quadrant of Figure 1), the evolutionarily stable strategy for the 449 
unstressed individuals varies smoothly as parameter values are varied smoothly, 450 
whereas the ESS for stressed individuals undergoes dramatic change from complete 451 
specialisation in embryos on one side of the dividing line to complete specialisation in 452 
sperm on the other side. However, unless the dividing line given by expression (11) is 453 
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crossed, the specialist strategy of stressed individuals is insensitive to changes in 454 
parameter values.  455 
 456 
We can also look at the situation where stressed individuals are very common in the 457 
population. This is the top right quadrant of Figure 1. In the extreme case where 458 
almost all individuals are stressed, s 1, then stressed individuals should divide their 459 
investment equally between embryos and sperm (ms = 0.5). A prediction of the model 460 
in this case is that the evolutionarily stable strategy played by individuals when 461 
everyone is stressed is the same as the strategy played by individuals when no-one is 462 
stressed.   463 
 464 
As the number of stressed individuals declines from a high value, then again whether 465 
or not expression (11) is satisfied is key to our predictions. If expression (11) is 466 
satisfied then stressed individuals should invest less in sperm and unstressed 467 
individuals should invest entirely in sperm. However, if expression (11) is not 468 
satisfied, then in this case the model predicts that stressed individuals should increase 469 
their investment in sperm and unstressed individuals should invest solely in embryos.  470 
 471 
It is also possible to identify combinations of parameter values such that individuals 472 
of one type (either stressed or unstressed individuals) invest entirely in embryos and 473 
those of the other type invest entirely in sperm. For example, providing  >1 and b < 474 
1 then unstressed individuals should invest entirely in embryos and stressed 475 
individuals entirely in sperm. If we make the same assumption as above that b is equal 476 
to one, then (because we expect that  > ), then the above prediction will hold for an 477 
intermediate range of s values. Thus when a moderate fraction of the population is 478 
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stressed, the model predicts a complete breakdown of hermaphroditism, with stressed 479 
individuals producing only sperm and unstressed individuals only embryos.  480 
 481 
To simplify expressions, we have used linear gain functions in our model. However, 482 
the model framework could easily accommodate non-linear gain functions (as used by 483 
Charnov [3]). Although this would make manipulation of the model more 484 
cumbersome, there is no reason to expect that the addition of this complexity would 485 
have any qualitative effect on our predictions, unless this nonlinearity made 486 
intermediate strategies more profitable (e.g. if  fn (0.5)>0.5), in which case the 487 
predicted breakdown of hermaphroditism above would not be complete. 488 
 489 
A further key prediction of the model is that we would not expect to find situations in 490 
the natural world where both stressed and unstressed individuals are hermaphrodite. 491 
Rather, we would expect one or both of them to specialise in embryos or sperm. If 492 
however, populations in which stressed and unstressed individuals adopt a 493 
hermaphrodite strategy are found, then one or more of the assumptions of our model 494 
does not hold for that population. One assumption that may not be met in some real 495 
populations is that individuals have complete freedom to evolve to utilise any level of 496 
differential investment in male and female function in both the stressed and unstressed 497 
cases. It may be that there are physiological constraints on how much change in 498 
investment can be achieved. It may also be that the implicit assumption of our model 499 
of free and random mixing of gametes across the mixed population of stressed and 500 
unstressed individuals is not always valid. Further, it may also be that nonlinearity 501 
acts as described above.  We reiterate that a key aspect of our interpretation of the 502 
relevance of our model prediction for the natural world has been the assumption that 503 
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stress does not strongly affect the relative physiological costs of sperm and embryos. 504 
Empirical investigation of this assumption would be very valuable. Moreover, 505 
although our model applies to plants and animals with at least some post-zygotic 506 
investment of resources (excluding post-partum parental care, typically absent from 507 
sessile organisms), even a slight difference in the production rate of sperm and eggs 508 
would bring externally fertilizing invertebrates such as certain corals and hydroids [9] 509 
within its remit. To our knowledge, empirical data on the relative speeds of sperm and 510 
egg production by externally fertilizing invertebrates are lacking, but experimental 511 
determination of these values would be invaluable in the present context.  512 
 513 
We assume that individuals respond to their own state (whether they are stressed or 514 
not) and that such response is influenced by the fraction of the population that is 515 
stressed. It seems unlikely in many situations where this fraction varies unpredictably 516 
on short-timescales that individuals will be able to track such variation and respond 517 
appropriately through phenotypic plasticity. However, in many circumstances the 518 
fraction affected will either remain (at least approximately) constant over longer 519 
timescales, or vary predictably (for example seasonally, or in response to tidal cycles).  520 
Hence, our model implicitly assumes such a situation and that selection has moulded 521 
individuals to show responses to either being stressed or unstressed that are 522 
appropriate to the fraction of stressed individuals experienced in the population as a 523 
whole.  524 
 525 
Two previously published ESS models capture some of the elements of the present 526 
model. Freeman et al. [4] predict increasing male allocation by hermaphroditic plants 527 
occupying patches of habitat where dryness physiologically restricts seed production. 528 
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The predicted bias toward pollen production depended on the proportion of the 529 
population occupying dry patches. Dryness would be regarded as a form of stress in 530 
our model. Day and Aarssen [8] predict greater male allocation in smaller individuals 531 
within a population of hermaphroditic plants, where survivorship increases with size. 532 
Smaller individuals are likely to die before the relatively prolonged process of seed 533 
production can be completed, yet are still likely to produce a significant quantity of 534 
pollen. If survivorship is also determined by site/patch quality independently of plant 535 
size, individuals occupying poorer sites should increase male allocation. In the above 536 
respects, therefore, Freeman et al. [4] and Day and Aarssen [8] make similar 537 
predictions to each other, and predictions that are in accord with those discussed 538 
above generated by our model. Our model contributes further to investigation of the 539 
effects of environmental stress on sexual investment by explicitly considering 540 
reciprocal dependence of optimal sex allocation in stressed and non-stressed 541 
individuals as a function of survivorship and likelihood of being stressed. We very 542 
much hope that the novel predictions generated in this regard are sufficiently clear and 543 
general to encourage empirical testing.  544 
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Figure caption: Summary of model predictions. The strategy of an individual in 581 
terms of its division of investment between male and female reproduction is defined 582 
by the pair {mn,ms,}, this being the investment in male sexual function (called 583 
“sperm” in the text) by an individual experiencing either normal (n) or stressed (s) 584 
conditions (mn, ms [0,1]). An individual playing {mn,ms} will produce a fraction 585 
mn(ms) of the sperm in the unstressed (stressed) condition that it would produce if it 586 
chose to invest entirely in sperm: mn=1(ms=1). It is assumed that all resources not 587 
invested in male function are allocated to female function. Thus we explicitly assume 588 
that individuals have a flexible strategy for investment between male and female 589 
functions, and change strategy according to whether they perceive themselves as 590 
stressed or not. The strategy is influenced by a combination of values given to each of 591 
two parameter groups,  and b . We assume that each individual has (independent) 592 
probability s of being stressed. If an individual is stressed, then there is a probability 593 
that the individual will die before resources allocated to sperm can be released as 594 
functioning gametes. This is represented as a probability pm that resources allocated to 595 
male function lead to successful production of viable gametes. There is a similar 596 
probability for investment in female function: pf. As discussed in the introduction, the 597 
overwhelming empirical evidence is for pm to be greater than pf.  598 
s
spm
1
 599 
and 600 
s
sp f
1
. 601 
The parameter b describes the effect of stress on the trade-off between sperm and 602 
embryos. If b is equal to one then stress has no effect on this trade-off. If b is greater 603 
than 1, then sperm is more expensive (relative to embryos) for stressed individuals 604 
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compared to unstressed individuals. Conversely, if b is less than one then sperm is 605 
less expensive for stressed individuals. 606 
 607 
